O constitucionalismo inercial e a ineficácia das políticas públicas de pacificação de territórios no Brasil

Abstract

The construction of public policies aimed at the pacification of violated territories faces academic and socio-political obstacles. In the first perspective, considering the complexity of the object, there is an inevitable overflow of the formal and analytical canons of merely institutionalist views. On the second point, there is a lack of interest, especially on the part of the bodies of the justice system, in authentically facing this issue, as it does not offer sufficient symbolic capital within the context of interpretative supremacy of the rule of law on the part of its agents. In this way, the aim is to understand to what extent the contradictory distancing of the justice system from citizen security policies compromises their effectiveness. The theories that underlie the field of public policies will be reviewed, as well as dialogue with field theory and the sociology of professions to understand the constitutional design, responsible for the emergence of a legal elite from the process of intense autonomy conferred by the Federal Constitution of 1988. Allied to this, it will be seen how an inertial democracy (Baquero), combined with this institutional design, will produce an inertial constitutionalism that contradictorily strengthens the organs of the justice system, but distances them from their task of guaranteeing effective access to justice, especially in socially essential themes, but devoid of symbolic rewards. Data from the first experiences of some citizen security projects and their impacts on reducing violent crimes will be analyzed, comparing the same rates after the discontinuation of such projects.